TC Marine Emergency Duties B1/B2 (MEDB)

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.255, any individual who does not hold a valid TWIC must be escorted while in restricted areas of a facility. The escort must be a person who holds a valid TWIC and is authorized by the facility to perform escort duties, ensuring they maintain a side-by-side presence or continuous visual and audible contact to prevent unauthorized access or suspicious activity.

Incorrect: Relying solely on electronic surveillance like CCTV does not meet the physical escort requirements mandated for restricted areas under federal maritime security regulations. Simply conducting a secondary background check or issuing a local badge does not waive the federal requirement for a TWIC-holding escort in sensitive zones. The strategy of using cordoned-off zones without an active, physical escort fails to provide the continuous monitoring required to mitigate risks in restricted facility locations.

Takeaway: Non-TWIC holders in restricted areas must be continuously monitored by a TWIC-holding escort to ensure facility security integrity and regulatory compliance.

Correct: Under 33 CFR Part 105, the Facility Security Plan must describe how the facility will meet performance standards for each MARSEC level. This includes the ability to deter and prevent unauthorized access and the introduction of prohibited items. Effective standards focus on outcomes, such as the thoroughness and frequency of screenings, which must be scalable to address the heightened risks associated with MARSEC Levels 2 and 3.

Incorrect: Focusing only on hardware specifications fails to account for the procedural changes and human elements required to adapt to different threat levels. The strategy of relying on the Captain of the Port for daily instructions ignores the officer’s regulatory responsibility to develop a comprehensive, self-contained plan. Opting to only plan for MARSEC Level 1 ignores the legal mandate to have pre-planned, scalable security measures ready for immediate implementation.

Takeaway: Security performance standards must be outcome-based and scalable to ensure effectiveness across all MARSEC levels per 33 CFR Part 105.

Correct: According to 33 CFR 105.415, the FSO is responsible for ensuring that the Facility Security Plan (FSP) is audited at least annually and updated as necessary. When drills or exercises reveal that the current plan is no longer effective or contains gaps, the FSO must initiate an audit and submit any substantive amendments to the Captain of the Port (COTP). This ensures that the facility’s primary security document remains a living reflection of actual operations and meets federal standards for maritime security.

Incorrect: The strategy of delaying notification until the five-year renewal cycle is incorrect because 33 CFR 105 requires timely amendments when security gaps are identified. Simply testing new procedures in drills without formalizing them in the FSP fails to meet the legal requirement for maintaining an approved security plan. Opting for a Suspicious Activity Report is inappropriate in this context as SARs are intended for reporting specific security incidents or threats rather than administrative improvements to the facility’s internal security framework.

Takeaway: Continuous improvement of the FSP requires regular audits and formal amendments submitted to the COTP when security gaps are identified.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.255 and 105.275, the FSO is responsible for ensuring that security measures, including lighting and surveillance for shore-side infrastructure, allow for the continuous monitoring of the facility. These measures must provide the capability to detect unauthorized access and maintain clear zones across all MARSEC levels to ensure the integrity of the facility’s restricted areas and critical assets.

Incorrect: Prioritizing aesthetic integration over functional security requirements fails to meet the regulatory standards for effective deterrence and detection mandated by federal law. Relying solely on motion-activated sensors is insufficient because it may create gaps in the continuous monitoring required for high-risk areas or during elevated threat levels. The strategy of delegating total oversight to local police ignores the FSO’s legal responsibility to maintain and implement the FSP as mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act.

Takeaway: FSOs must ensure shore-side infrastructure security measures provide continuous detection and monitoring capabilities consistent with the Facility Security Plan.

Correct: According to 33 CFR 105.305, the Facility Security Assessment must be a comprehensive, written evaluation of the facility’s vulnerabilities. It requires a systematic analysis of each vulnerability and the potential consequences of a security incident. This process ensures that the Facility Security Plan is built upon a foundation of prioritized risks specific to the facility’s current operations and cargo types.

Incorrect: The strategy of only updating equipment inventories fails to address the fundamental changes in the threat landscape caused by new hazardous materials. Choosing to adopt protocols from neighboring facilities is insufficient because the regulations mandate a site-specific assessment tailored to the unique layout and operations of the individual facility. Focusing only on perimeter security is inadequate as it ignores internal procedural gaps, personnel vulnerabilities, and the specific risks associated with vessel-to-facility interfaces.

Takeaway: The Facility Security Assessment must involve a systematic, site-specific evaluation of vulnerabilities and consequences to satisfy USCG regulatory standards.

Correct: Under 33 CFR Part 105, the FSO is responsible for ensuring that the Facility Security Assessment (FSA) accurately reflects the current threat environment, including waterside risks. By evaluating both the likelihood and the consequences of a specific threat like a WBIED, the FSO can determine if the existing security measures in the Facility Security Plan (FSP) are adequate or if amendments are necessary to protect the facility’s infrastructure and personnel.

Incorrect: The strategy of unilaterally raising the MARSEC level is incorrect because the authority to set or change MARSEC levels rests with the Coast Guard Commandant or the local Captain of the Port, not the FSO. Focusing only on land-side security ignores the regulatory requirement for facilities to address all interfaces, including the waterborne boundaries of the terminal. Choosing to use a generic, unmodified threat matrix from a third party fails to satisfy the legal mandate for a site-specific assessment that accounts for the unique geographical and operational characteristics of the facility.

Takeaway: FSOs must conduct site-specific assessments that evaluate the likelihood and impact of maritime threats to ensure the Facility Security Plan remains effective.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.285, when the MARSEC level increases to Level 2, the facility must be able to increase the frequency and intensity of monitoring and patrols of the facility’s perimeter and restricted areas. This ensures that any attempts at unauthorized access are detected more quickly during periods of increased risk as identified by the Coast Guard.

Incorrect: The strategy of upgrading all lighting to infrared technology is not a regulatory requirement and represents an unnecessary capital expenditure rather than a procedural shift required by the FSP. Stationing guards at every single emergency exit is an inefficient use of personnel that is not mandated by the performance-based standards of the Maritime Transportation Security Act. Choosing to suspend all maintenance activities could lead to system failures at critical moments, which contradicts the requirement to maintain security equipment in good working order.

Takeaway: MARSEC Level 2 necessitates increased patrol frequency and more intensive monitoring of surveillance systems to detect unauthorized activity effectively.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.200, the FSO is specifically tasked with liaising with the Coast Guard and other relevant law enforcement agencies. This includes ensuring the Facility Security Plan remains consistent with the Area Maritime Security Plan and reporting all suspicious activities to the National Response Center or the Captain of the Port.

Incorrect: Delegating all federal communication to the Company Security Officer fails to fulfill the FSO’s direct regulatory responsibility for facility-level coordination. The strategy of restricting information to local police ignores the primary jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard over maritime facility security. Choosing to withhold records until a subpoena is issued contradicts the requirement for FSOs to cooperate with federal officials during security inspections and investigations.

Takeaway: The FSO must maintain active liaison with the USCG Captain of the Port to ensure facility security aligns with regional maritime strategies.

Correct: Under 33 CFR Part 105 and the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), the FSO is responsible for the overall security of the facility, which includes ensuring that security measures are carried out professionally and legally. Security personnel must operate within the boundaries of their legal authority, which is typically limited compared to sworn law enforcement. Ethically and legally, the FSO must ensure that procedures for searches and detentions are clearly defined, proportional to the threat, and compliant with constitutional protections and local statutes to prevent civil rights violations and legal liability.

Incorrect: The strategy of attempting to grant private guards the same powers as sworn law enforcement is legally invalid as such authority is typically reserved for government-sanctioned peace officers. Relying solely on contract indemnification is a failure of oversight because the facility owner and FSO remain regulatory responsible for security conduct under Coast Guard standards. Choosing to authorize any physical means necessary ignores the legal requirement for proportional response and creates significant ethical and legal risks for the facility and its personnel.

Takeaway: FSOs must ensure security actions remain within legal boundaries to protect individual rights while maintaining regulatory compliance and facility safety.

Correct: Under 33 CFR Part 105, the Facility Security Plan must include procedures for responding to security threats and breaches of security. Integrating these procedures into the FSP and coordinating with the Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) ensures that the facility’s actions are interoperable with federal and local law enforcement response efforts.

Incorrect: The strategy of maintaining protocols in a separate handbook outside the FSP fails to meet the regulatory requirement that security response procedures be part of the formally approved plan. Relying on a consultant to keep the plan independent of local law enforcement is counterproductive because the Maritime Transportation Security Act emphasizes coordination with external authorities. Choosing to keep documentation only at a corporate headquarters prevents the FSO and facility personnel from having immediate access to critical procedures during an actual emergency. Opting for a plan that lacks local coordination ignores the necessity of established communication channels with the Coast Guard during a security incident.

Takeaway: FSOs must integrate emergency response procedures into the FSP and coordinate with the USCG and local authorities to ensure regulatory compliance.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.200, the FSO is responsible for ensuring that security actions are consistent with and integrated into the facility’s overall emergency response procedures. This regulatory requirement ensures that the Facility Security Plan (FSP) does not conflict with the Facility Response Plan (FRP), allowing for a unified and efficient response to incidents while maintaining compliance with Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) standards.

Incorrect: Focusing only on physical lockdowns without external notification ignores the regulatory requirement for timely reporting and coordination with federal and local partners during a security incident. The strategy of delegating all coordination to the Captain of the Port misinterprets the FSO’s personal responsibility to manage facility-level security as outlined in the FSP. Opting for an indefinite suspension of operations for a third-party audit is an excessive business disruption that does not address the immediate regulatory requirement for plan integration and drill-based improvement.

Takeaway: The FSO must ensure the Facility Security Plan is fully integrated and consistent with the facility’s broader emergency response framework and regulations.

Correct: Under 33 CFR Part 105, the Facility Security Officer is responsible for ensuring that all security equipment is properly operated, tested, and maintained. Establishing a documented calibration and testing schedule based on manufacturer guidelines ensures the equipment consistently meets the detection standards defined in the Facility Security Plan (FSP) and remains in good working order as required by federal regulations.

Incorrect: The strategy of relying on factory settings fails to account for the specific environmental conditions and electromagnetic interference common in maritime industrial zones which can drift over time. Choosing to maximize sensitivity without proper calibration often results in unmanageable false alarm rates that degrade security effectiveness and cause operational bottlenecks. Opting for remote monitoring without local physical testing ignores the requirement for the FSO to verify that the physical screening process is actually functioning on-site as intended.

Takeaway: FSOs must ensure screening equipment is regularly calibrated and tested according to the FSP and manufacturer standards to maintain regulatory compliance.

Correct: According to 33 CFR 105.265, the Facility Security Officer must ensure that security measures are in place to deter tampering and prevent unauthorized access to cargo. This includes implementing procedures to routinely check cargo and storage areas for signs of interference, ensuring the integrity of the supply chain while the cargo is within the facility’s footprint.

Incorrect: The strategy of limiting operations to daylight hours is an operational restriction that is not required by federal regulations and fails to address the need for continuous security monitoring. Opting for a 100% physical inspection of all containers at MARSEC Level 1 exceeds standard regulatory requirements and is generally not feasible for high-volume facilities without specific threat intelligence. Choosing to delegate all security duties to the vessel’s personnel ignores the facility’s legal obligation under the Maritime Transportation Security Act to secure its own premises and the cargo handled therein.

Takeaway: FSOs must implement systematic, routine checks of cargo and storage areas to detect tampering and ensure facility security compliance.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.215, all facility personnel, including long-term contractors, must have knowledge of the relevant provisions of the Facility Security Plan (FSP). This includes the ability to recognize and respond to security threats, understand the meaning of different Maritime Security (MARSEC) Levels, and identify methods used by unauthorized individuals to bypass physical security controls.

Incorrect: Disclosing the full Facility Security Assessment is a breach of Sensitive Security Information (SSI) protocols because general personnel should only know the procedures in the Plan, not the underlying vulnerability data. Requiring technical mastery of Vessel Traffic Services is inappropriate as these systems are managed by specialized operators rather than general contractors. Mandating tactical use-of-force training is incorrect because such specialized instruction is reserved for armed security personnel and exceeds the regulatory requirements for general facility security awareness.

Takeaway: Facility personnel must be trained in threat recognition and relevant FSP procedures before being assigned duties in secure areas.

Correct: According to 33 CFR 105.245, security exercises are designed to test the overall proficiency of facility personnel and the effectiveness of the Facility Security Plan. The regulations require that these exercises be conducted at least once each calendar year, with the interval between exercises not exceeding 18 months. These exercises can be full-scale, tabletop, or integrated into a larger community or cooperative exercise involving other facilities or vessels.

Incorrect: The strategy of requiring exercises every six months with mandatory Captain of the Port attendance exceeds the actual regulatory frequency and incorrectly implies that federal officials must be present for every exercise. Relying on MARSEC level changes or post-incident reviews as the only triggers for exercises fails to meet the proactive, periodic testing requirements established by federal maritime security standards. Choosing a quarterly schedule confuses the requirements for security drills, which are smaller-scale and occur every three months, with the more comprehensive annual exercise requirement. Focusing exclusively on full-scale deployments with external emergency services ignores the flexibility allowed for tabletop or functional exercises that still satisfy regulatory mandates.

Takeaway: Facility security exercises must be conducted annually, with no more than 18 months between sessions, to ensure Facility Security Plan effectiveness.

Correct: Under 33 CFR Part 105 and standard maritime security protocols, suspicious packages must be treated as potential threats. The correct procedure involves isolating the area to protect personnel, ensuring the item is not disturbed to avoid triggering a potential device, and notifying the proper authorities such as the National Response Center (NRC) and local emergency responders as defined in the Facility Security Plan.

Incorrect: The strategy of moving the item to a remote zone is highly dangerous because any movement could trigger a pressure-sensitive or motion-activated explosive device. Choosing to open the bag for internal inspection is a violation of safety protocols as facility personnel are generally not trained in Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and such actions place lives at risk. Relying on a delayed response while reviewing footage or waiting for additional management ignores the immediate risk to critical infrastructure and personnel safety during a potential security incident.

Takeaway: Suspicious items must be isolated and reported to authorities immediately without being touched, moved, or opened by facility personnel or security staff.

Correct: 33 CFR Part 105 is the specific federal regulation that implements the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) requirements for facilities. It details the responsibilities of the Facility Security Officer and the necessary components of a Facility Security Plan.

Incorrect: Relying on 46 CFR Part 10 is incorrect because those regulations focus on the licensing and certification of merchant mariners rather than facility security. The strategy of using 49 CFR Part 172 is insufficient as it governs the transportation of hazardous materials and related communication standards. Focusing only on 33 CFR Part 165 is misplaced because that section deals with the establishment of specific safety zones and regulated navigation areas rather than facility-wide security management.

Takeaway: 33 CFR Part 105 provides the primary regulatory framework for maritime facility security and Facility Security Plan requirements in the United States.

Correct: According to 33 CFR Part 105, the FSO is tasked with ensuring the Facility Security Plan (FSP) remains effective and is updated to reflect changes in the facility’s security environment. Conducting an assessment and formalizing amendments ensures that the security measures are legally compliant and technically sound, with oversight from the USCG Captain of the Port (COTP) for significant changes.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.305, the Facility Security Assessment must be a risk-based analysis that considers various threat scenarios, the vulnerability of each target to those threats, and the consequences of a successful attack. This holistic approach ensures that security measures are proportional to the actual risk rather than just meeting a static set of physical requirements. By evaluating both likelihood and consequence, the FSO can identify which assets require the most robust protection to prevent a Transportation Security Incident (TSI).

Incorrect: Relying on standardized checklists often misses site-specific vulnerabilities that a dynamic risk assessment would uncover. The strategy of using only historical breach data is insufficient because it does not account for emerging threats or changes in adversary tactics. Focusing only on the financial replacement cost of equipment ignores critical security outcomes such as environmental disasters, loss of life, or the disruption of the national transportation system.

Takeaway: A compliant Facility Security Assessment must integrate threat, vulnerability, and consequence analysis to effectively prioritize security resources under USCG regulations.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.305, the Facility Security Assessment (FSA) is the foundational document used to identify vulnerabilities and assess risks. Prioritizing investments based on the FSA ensures that resources are directed toward mitigating the most significant threats and vulnerabilities specific to that facility’s operations and location.

Incorrect: Distributing funds equally across all categories fails to account for the varying levels of risk associated with different facility assets. Choosing technology based solely on its advanced nature might lead to over-investing in low-risk areas while leaving critical physical vulnerabilities unaddressed. Relying only on past inspection findings is a reactive strategy that ignores the comprehensive, proactive risk analysis required by the Facility Security Plan.

Takeaway: Security investments must be prioritized based on the risk-based findings of the Facility Security Assessment to ensure regulatory compliance.

Correct: Under 33 CFR Part 105, the Facility Security Officer is responsible for ensuring that all facility personnel are briefed on relevant security provisions and that security awareness is maintained. Addressing human factors like tailgating or social engineering requires a shift in organizational culture through active training and behavioral testing. By emphasizing individual accountability and using unannounced drills, the FSO ensures that security is a shared responsibility rather than just a technical hurdle, which is essential for a robust Facility Security Plan.

Incorrect: Relying solely on technical upgrades like alarm sensitivity or more cameras fails to address the underlying behavioral issue of social engineering or employee complacency. The strategy of shifting all monitoring duties to third-party contractors ignores the regulatory requirement for all facility personnel to have a baseline level of security awareness and participation. Choosing to send a one-time memorandum often lacks the necessary impact to change long-term habits and does not provide a mechanism for verifying that the behavior has actually improved through performance-based metrics.

Takeaway: Effective security requires balancing technical controls with a robust culture of individual accountability and regular behavioral testing.

Correct: According to 33 CFR Part 105, the FSO is responsible for the development and maintenance of the Facility Security Plan (FSP) but must coordinate with the Company Security Officer (CSO). This collaboration ensures that the Facility Security Assessment (FSA) remains current and that any changes to the facility’s security posture are consistent with the company’s broader security policies and regulatory obligations under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).

Incorrect: The strategy of implementing independent updates to the FSP without CSO involvement bypasses the necessary organizational oversight required for maritime security compliance. Simply waiting for a federal inspection to address a known vulnerability is a failure of the FSO’s proactive duty to maintain an effective security plan. Opting to delegate the entire risk analysis to the CSO is incorrect because the FSO is specifically tasked with the local knowledge and day-to-day management of the facility’s unique security environment.

Takeaway: The FSO must work closely with the CSO to ensure facility-specific security assessments and plans remain integrated with the company’s total security framework.

Correct: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is defined by the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact security. Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and 33 CFR Part 105, FSOs are encouraged to participate in a collaborative environment. Sharing real-time data and suspicious activity reports with the Captain of the Port (COTP) and the Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committee enhances the common operating picture, allowing for a more effective regional response to potential threats.

Incorrect: The strategy of limiting information to internal personnel only contradicts the fundamental MDA principle of information sharing and prevents the Coast Guard from gaining a comprehensive view of regional threats. Relying solely on physical hardening and personnel increases ignores the critical informational and situational awareness components necessary to identify threats before they reach the perimeter. Choosing to prioritize commercial data over small craft activity creates a significant security gap, as non-regulated small vessels often represent a higher risk profile in the context of maritime security and domain awareness.

Takeaway: Maritime Domain Awareness requires FSOs to actively share information and integrate facility security data into the broader regional common operating picture.

Correct: According to 33 CFR Part 105, the Facility Security Plan must be performance-based, meaning it defines the security outcomes that must be achieved at each MARSEC level. This allows the Facility Security Officer the flexibility to implement various combinations of technology, personnel, and procedures as long as they meet the specific functional requirements and security objectives mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).

Incorrect: The strategy of adopting a prescriptive list of identical hardware fails to account for the unique risk assessments and operational environments of different facilities. Relying on law enforcement for all higher MARSEC level objectives is incorrect because the facility must have its own pre-planned, scalable measures documented in the FSP. Focusing only on physical infrastructure ignores the regulatory requirement for a holistic security approach that integrates personnel training and procedural protocols into the performance standards.

Takeaway: Facility security objectives must be performance-based and scalable to meet the functional requirements of all three MARSEC levels effectively.

Correct: Under 33 CFR Part 105, the Facility Security Officer is responsible for ensuring that security threats and incidents are reported to the National Response Center (NRC) or the local Captain of the Port (COTP) without delay. This direct liaison ensures that the United States Coast Guard can coordinate a federal response and assess the impact on the wider port area.

Incorrect: Relying solely on local municipal police is insufficient because they may lack the specific maritime jurisdiction or specialized resources required for federal port security coordination. The strategy of delaying notification until private security confirms a threat is dangerous and violates the regulatory mandate for prompt reporting of suspicious activities. Opting to delegate all federal communications to the Company Security Officer ignores the FSO’s specific regulatory duty to maintain direct liaison with authorities at the facility level during an active incident.

Takeaway: The FSO must promptly report security threats to the National Response Center or the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port.

Correct: Under 33 CFR Part 105, an increase to MARSEC Level 2 requires the facility to implement additional protective measures defined in the FSP. This specifically includes intensifying the inspection process for cargo and transport vehicles to detect unauthorized substances or tampering more effectively than at the baseline level.

Incorrect: The strategy of halting all hazardous material transfers is typically an extreme measure reserved for MARSEC Level 3 or specific directives from federal authorities. Opting for a mandatory forty-eight hour quarantine for every container is not a standard regulatory requirement and would create unsustainable logistical bottlenecks. Relying on the delegation of seal verification to vessel personnel fails to meet the facility’s independent regulatory obligation to secure the shore-side interface and monitor cargo integrity.

Takeaway: MARSEC Level 2 necessitates an increase in the frequency and intensity of cargo and vehicle inspections at U.S. maritime facilities.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.415, the annual audit of the Facility Security Plan must be conducted by persons who have knowledge of the security requirements but are independent of the specific security measures being audited. This independence is crucial to ensure that the evaluation of the facility’s security posture is objective and that any deficiencies in the FSO’s implementation are identified without bias.

Incorrect: Relying on a third-party contractor is a common industry practice but is not a strict regulatory requirement as long as internal staff meet the independence criteria. Having the FSO lead the audit is incorrect because the regulations require the auditor to be independent of the measures they are reviewing, and the FSO is responsible for those measures. Expecting the Captain of the Port to conduct the audit misinterprets the facility’s responsibility for self-auditing versus the Coast Guard’s role in external verification and enforcement.

Takeaway: Annual FSP audits must be performed by knowledgeable individuals who are independent of the security measures they are evaluating.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.405, a Facility Security Plan must include specific procedures for responding to security threats or breaches. This includes maintaining the essential interface between the facility and any vessels moored there during an incident. The regulation ensures that security measures do not completely compromise the safety of the vessel-to-shore connection during emergencies.

Incorrect: Including personal residential addresses and financial disclosures of all employees is not a requirement of the FSP and would raise significant privacy and data protection concerns. Focusing on the commercial market value of cargo and insurance liability limits describes a business continuity or logistics function rather than a security protocol required by the Coast Guard. The strategy of requiring all security guards to be sworn law enforcement officers exceeds the regulatory standards set by the Maritime Transportation Security Act, which allows for trained private security personnel.

Takeaway: A comprehensive FSP must prioritize procedures for security incident response and the maintenance of the critical facility-vessel interface.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.235, the FSO is responsible for ensuring that communication systems are effective and have sufficient redundancy. This includes the ability to communicate internally among security staff and externally with vessels and the Captain of the Port. Independent power sources and diverse systems prevent a single point of failure from compromising the entire security infrastructure during an incident.

Incorrect: Focusing only on a single-source satellite link creates a critical vulnerability because any localized interference or hardware failure would leave the facility without any means of communication. Choosing to use personal mobile devices and commercial apps introduces significant security risks regarding data privacy and lacks the reliability required for emergency maritime security operations. The strategy of funneling security traffic through a corporate IT help desk introduces unnecessary delays and relies on personnel who may not be trained in maritime security protocols.

Takeaway: FSOs must implement redundant, independent communication systems to ensure continuous contact between facility personnel, vessels, and authorities under all conditions.

Correct: Under 33 CFR 105.210, personnel with designated security duties must possess the knowledge and receive training in specific areas, including the techniques used to perform physical screenings of individuals and goods to prevent the unauthorized introduction of dangerous substances and devices.

Incorrect: The strategy of requiring a full federal law enforcement academy course is not a regulatory requirement for facility personnel and exceeds the scope of standard FSP training. Opting for a five-year waiting period between training phases would leave personnel unprepared for their immediate responsibilities and violate the requirement for proficiency before assuming duties. Choosing to exempt individuals based on state-issued licenses is incorrect because federal regulations require all personnel with security duties to be trained on the specific procedures and protocols unique to their specific Facility Security Plan.

Takeaway: Personnel with security duties must be trained in specific screening methods and facility protocols to comply with 33 CFR Part 105.